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Author SHA1 Message Date
xfy
ff2694c5a3 feat(image): make size/pixel limits configurable, double defaults
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将 MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION / MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS 从编译期 const 改为运行时
LazyLock(启动读环境变量),默认值 x2。

- 默认值:单边 4096→8192,总像素 25M→50M
- clamp 策略:只设下限防危险小值(DIMENSION≥512,PIXELS≥1M),
  超下限 clamp + warn;无上限,完全信任运维
- 内存影响:默认 50M 像素对应 ~200MB/图解码缓冲(max_alloc)
- 模式复用 WEBP_CONFIG:env→parse→(val,clamped)→clamp→warn→info
- 所有引用点解引用(*MAX_...),含 upload.rs/webp.rs 跨文件
- check_upload_dimensions 超限文案改为动态读取上限,不再硬编码数值
- 测试改用 *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION+1,数值无关

.env.example 与 AGENTS.md 同步更新环境变量说明。
2026-06-24 13:54:36 +08:00
xfy
933c7a8c93 docs(env): document hardcoded image upload size limits
本次上传尺寸统一为硬编码 const(非环境变量),但 .env.example 已有
记录硬编码默认值的体例(如图片缓存头)。补一段说明上限数值与超限行为,
便于部署者知晓 4096/25M 的存在及调整方式。
2026-06-24 13:26:11 +08:00
xfy
0777fd469a fix(upload): unify image size limit across all formats
上传入口此前对超大图片行为不一致:JPEG/PNG 因 decode limits 失败后
静默存原图,WebP 报"损坏",GIF 完全不查。统一为 header 阶段硬拒绝。

- image.rs: 新增 check_upload_dimensions,按 MIME 只读 header 拿尺寸
  (WebP 走 zenwebp header,JPEG/PNG/GIF 走 image into_dimensions),
  超 MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION/MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS 返回友好提示
- upload.rs: magic bytes 校验后插入统一尺寸校验,三种格式同路径
- upload.rs: JPEG/PNG 转码 fallback 的 Err(_) 改为 Err(e) 带原因日志
  (超限已在 header 阶段拦截,此处仅剩真损坏兜底)

读取侧 serve_image 不动;webp::decode 内的像素校验保留(读取侧仍需)。
2026-06-24 13:25:23 +08:00
5 changed files with 242 additions and 19 deletions

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@ -102,6 +102,20 @@ COMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS=gzip,brotli,deflate,zstd
# - 原始上传:更改其文件路径; # - 原始上传:更改其文件路径;
# - 处理变体:更改处理参数(查询串不同即视为新资源)。 # - 处理变体:更改处理参数(查询串不同即视为新资源)。
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 上传图片尺寸/像素上限(运行时环境变量,启动时读一次)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 上传与动态处理(?w= 等)在 header 阶段统一校验(JPEG/PNG/WebP/GIF 同一路径),
# 超限直接 400 拒绝。这两个值同时也是图片解码的安全护栏(防超大图撑爆内存)。
# 只设下限防误调到危险小值,无上限(完全信任运维);低于下限会 clamp 并打 WARN。
# 注:读取侧 GET /uploads/* 的无参数取原图分支不查像素(只卡 20MB 字节)。
# 图片单边(宽或高)尺寸上限,单位像素。默认 8192,下限 512。
MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION=8192
# 图片总像素上限。默认 50_000_000(约 7000×7000),下限 1_000_000。
# ⚠️ 此值决定单图解码内存缓冲(max_alloc = pixels × 4 + 1MB),
# 默认 50M 像素对应约 200MB/图;上调前确认部署环境内存与并发上传量。
MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS=50000000
# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 图片磁盘缓存上限uploads/.cache/,后台清理任务每小时扫描一次) # 图片磁盘缓存上限uploads/.cache/,后台清理任务每小时扫描一次)
# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

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@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ Optional tuning via env vars (all have sane defaults):
``` ```
WEBP_QUALITY=85.0 # 0.0100.0, clamped WEBP_QUALITY=85.0 # 0.0100.0, clamped
WEBP_METHOD=2 # 06, clamped WEBP_METHOD=2 # 06, clamped
MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION=8192 # max single side in px, min 512, no upper limit
MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS=50000000 # max total pixels (~7k×7k), min 1M, no upper limit
RATE_LIMIT_STRICT_PER_SEC=1 RATE_LIMIT_STRICT_PER_SEC=1
RATE_LIMIT_STRICT_BURST=5 RATE_LIMIT_STRICT_BURST=5
RATE_LIMIT_UPLOAD_PER_SEC=2 RATE_LIMIT_UPLOAD_PER_SEC=2

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@ -44,12 +44,70 @@ fn etag_matches(if_none_match: &str, etag: &str) -> bool {
} }
#[cfg(feature = "server")] #[cfg(feature = "server")]
pub const MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION: u32 = 4096; /// 图片单边(宽或高)尺寸上限,单位像素。
///
/// 启动时从 `MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION` 环境变量读取,默认 8192。
/// 只设下限 512防误调到危险小值导致正常图都传不上无上限完全信任运维
/// 低于下限时 clamp 回 512 并打 WARN。
pub static MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION: LazyLock<u32> = LazyLock::new(|| {
const DEFAULT: u32 = 8192;
const MIN: u32 = 512;
let (val, clamped) = std::env::var("MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u32>().ok())
.map(|v| {
if v < MIN {
(MIN, true)
} else {
(v, false)
}
})
.unwrap_or((DEFAULT, false));
if clamped {
tracing::warn!(
"MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION was clamped from {} to {} (minimum {})",
std::env::var("MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION").unwrap_or_default(),
val,
MIN
);
}
tracing::info!("Image dimension limit loaded: {}", val);
val
});
#[cfg(feature = "server")] #[cfg(feature = "server")]
const DEFAULT_JPEG_QUALITY: u8 = 85; const DEFAULT_JPEG_QUALITY: u8 = 85;
#[cfg(feature = "server")] #[cfg(feature = "server")]
/// 允许处理的最大图片像素数(约 5k x 5k /// 允许处理的最大图片像素数(默认约 7k x 7k
pub const MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS: u32 = 25_000_000; // ~5k x 5k ///
/// 启动时从 `MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS` 环境变量读取,默认 50_000_000。
/// 只设下限 1_000_000防误调无上限。
/// ⚠️ 此值同时决定单图解码内存缓冲max_alloc = pixels × 4 + 1MB
/// 默认 50M 像素对应约 200MB/图,上调前确认部署环境内存。
pub static MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS: LazyLock<u32> = LazyLock::new(|| {
const DEFAULT: u32 = 50_000_000;
const MIN: u32 = 1_000_000;
let (val, clamped) = std::env::var("MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS")
.ok()
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u32>().ok())
.map(|v| {
if v < MIN {
(MIN, true)
} else {
(v, false)
}
})
.unwrap_or((DEFAULT, false));
if clamped {
tracing::warn!(
"MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS was clamped from {} to {} (minimum {})",
std::env::var("MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS").unwrap_or_default(),
val,
MIN
);
}
tracing::info!("Image pixel limit loaded: {}", val);
val
});
#[cfg(feature = "server")] #[cfg(feature = "server")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)] #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@ -122,12 +180,12 @@ impl ImageParams {
/// 校验参数合法性,返回 HTTP 400 状态码表示非法。 /// 校验参数合法性,返回 HTTP 400 状态码表示非法。
fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), StatusCode> { fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), StatusCode> {
if let Some(dim) = self.w { if let Some(dim) = self.w {
if dim == 0 || dim > MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION { if dim == 0 || dim > *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION {
return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
} }
} }
if let Some(dim) = self.h { if let Some(dim) = self.h {
if dim == 0 || dim > MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION { if dim == 0 || dim > *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION {
return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
} }
} }
@ -148,7 +206,7 @@ impl ImageParams {
} }
let tw: u32 = parts[0].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?; let tw: u32 = parts[0].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
let th: u32 = parts[1].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?; let th: u32 = parts[1].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
if tw == 0 || th == 0 || tw > MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION || th > MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION { if tw == 0 || th == 0 || tw > *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION || th > *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION {
return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
} }
} }
@ -241,25 +299,88 @@ fn check_image_dimensions(width: u32, height: u32) -> Result<(), StatusCode> {
return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); return Err(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
} }
let pixels = u64::from(width) * u64::from(height); let pixels = u64::from(width) * u64::from(height);
if pixels > u64::from(MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS) { if pixels > u64::from(*MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS) {
tracing::warn!( tracing::warn!(
"Image dimensions too large: {}x{} ({} pixels, max {})", "Image dimensions too large: {}x{} ({} pixels, max {})",
width, width,
height, height,
pixels, pixels,
MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS *MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS
); );
return Err(StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE); return Err(StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE);
} }
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
#[cfg(feature = "server")]
/// 仅读取 header 校验上传图片的尺寸/像素是否超限。
///
/// 与 `check_image_dimensions` 的区别:
/// - 输入是原始字节 + MIME,内部按 MIME 分发只解析 header 拿尺寸(不解码像素)
/// - 返回带友好中文提示的 `&'static str`(供上传接口直接回给用户)
///
/// 上传入口三种格式在此统一拦截至尺寸上限;WebP 走 `zenwebp` header,
/// JPEG/PNG/GIF 走 `image` crate 的 `into_dimensions`(均只读 header)。
pub fn check_upload_dimensions(data: &[u8], mime_type: &str) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
let dims = read_dimensions_by_mime(data, mime_type)?;
let (width, height) = dims;
if width == 0 || height == 0 {
return Err("图片文件损坏或格式不正确");
}
let pixels = u64::from(width) * u64::from(height);
let max_dim = *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION;
let max_pixels = *MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS;
if width > max_dim || height > max_dim || pixels > u64::from(max_pixels) {
tracing::warn!(
"Uploaded image too large: {}x{} ({} pixels, max {}x{} / {} pixels)",
width,
height,
pixels,
max_dim,
max_dim,
max_pixels
);
return Err("图片尺寸过大,请压缩后再上传");
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(feature = "server")]
/// 按 MIME 只读 header 拿 (width, height)。失败返回损坏错误。
fn read_dimensions_by_mime(
data: &[u8],
mime_type: &str,
) -> Result<(u32, u32), &'static str> {
match mime_type {
"image/webp" => {
// zenwebp 的 WebPDecoder::build 只解析 RIFF header,不解码像素(与 webp::decode 同源)。
let decoder = zenwebp::WebPDecoder::build(data)
.map_err(|_| "图片文件损坏或格式不正确")?;
let info = decoder.info();
Ok((info.width, info.height))
}
"image/jpeg" | "image/png" | "image/gif" => {
let format = match mime_type {
"image/jpeg" => image::ImageFormat::Jpeg,
"image/png" => image::ImageFormat::Png,
_ => image::ImageFormat::Gif,
};
let reader = image::ImageReader::with_format(std::io::Cursor::new(data), format);
reader
.into_dimensions()
.map_err(|_| "图片文件损坏或格式不正确")
}
// 上游已用 ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES 白名单拦截,理论不到这里
_ => Err("图片文件损坏或格式不正确"),
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "server")] #[cfg(feature = "server")]
fn image_reader_limits() -> image::Limits { fn image_reader_limits() -> image::Limits {
let mut limits = image::Limits::default(); let mut limits = image::Limits::default();
limits.max_image_width = Some(MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION); limits.max_image_width = Some(*MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION);
limits.max_image_height = Some(MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION); limits.max_image_height = Some(*MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION);
limits.max_alloc = Some(MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS as u64 * 4 + 1024 * 1024); limits.max_alloc = Some(*MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS as u64 * 4 + 1024 * 1024);
limits limits
} }
@ -297,7 +418,7 @@ fn process_image(
if parts.len() == 2 { if parts.len() == 2 {
let tw: u32 = parts[0].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?; let tw: u32 = parts[0].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
let th: u32 = parts[1].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?; let th: u32 = parts[1].parse().map_err(|_| StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
if tw > 0 && th > 0 && tw <= MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION && th <= MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION { if tw > 0 && th > 0 && tw <= *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION && th <= *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION {
img = img.thumbnail(tw, th); img = img.thumbnail(tw, th);
} }
} }
@ -644,6 +765,78 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(dims, None); assert_eq!(dims, None);
} }
// —— check_upload_dimensions:统一上传尺寸/像素上限校验 ——
/// 构造指定尺寸的 PNG 字节(内存占用 = 尺寸,仅用于 header 校验测试)。
fn make_png_bytes(w: u32, h: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
let img = image::DynamicImage::new_rgb8(w, h);
let mut buf = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::new());
img.write_to(&mut buf, image::ImageFormat::Png).unwrap();
buf.into_inner()
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_accepts_small_png() {
let data = make_png_bytes(100, 100);
assert!(check_upload_dimensions(&data, "image/png").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_accepts_boundary_png() {
// 用 7000×7000(≈49M 像素):单边 7000 < 默认 8192 上限,且总像素 < 默认 50M 上限,应放行。
// 注意不能直接用 *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION 做正方形边——8192²≈67M 会触发像素上限拒绝。
let data = make_png_bytes(7000, 7000);
assert!(check_upload_dimensions(&data, "image/png").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_rejects_oversized_width() {
// 单边超限:(上限+1)×1,像素远低于上限,但单边越界
let data = make_png_bytes(*MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION + 1, 1);
let err = check_upload_dimensions(&data, "image/png").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("尺寸过大"));
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_rejects_oversized_height() {
let data = make_png_bytes(1, *MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION + 1);
let err = check_upload_dimensions(&data, "image/png").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.contains("尺寸过大"));
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_accepts_small_webp() {
let img = image::DynamicImage::new_rgb8(64, 48);
let webp_bytes = crate::webp::encode(&img, 85.0, 2).unwrap();
assert!(check_upload_dimensions(&webp_bytes, "image/webp").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_accepts_gif() {
// image crate 默认启用 gif feature,into_dimensions 可读 GIF header
let img = image::DynamicImage::new_rgb8(32, 32);
let mut buf = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::new());
img.write_to(&mut buf, image::ImageFormat::Gif).unwrap();
assert!(check_upload_dimensions(&buf.into_inner(), "image/gif").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn check_upload_dimensions_rejects_corrupt_bytes() {
// 非 magic bytes,与现有损坏文件校验文案对齐
let err = check_upload_dimensions(b"not an image at all", "image/png").unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err, "图片文件损坏或格式不正确");
}
#[test]
fn read_dimensions_by_mime_dispatches_webp() {
let img = image::DynamicImage::new_rgb8(16, 9);
let webp_bytes = crate::webp::encode(&img, 85.0, 2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
read_dimensions_by_mime(&webp_bytes, "image/webp").unwrap(),
(16, 9)
);
}
#[test] #[test]
fn image_params_validate_valid_defaults() { fn image_params_validate_valid_defaults() {
let params = ImageParams::default(); let params = ImageParams::default();
@ -671,7 +864,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test] #[test]
fn image_params_validate_oversized_width_rejected() { fn image_params_validate_oversized_width_rejected() {
let params = ImageParams { let params = ImageParams {
w: Some(5000), w: Some(*MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION + 1),
..Default::default() ..Default::default()
}; };
assert!(params.validate().is_err()); assert!(params.validate().is_err());

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@ -208,6 +208,19 @@ pub async fn upload_image(
)); ));
} }
// 仅读 header 统一校验尺寸/像素上限。三种格式走同一路径:
// JPEG/PNG/GIF 用 image crate 的 into_dimensions,WebP 用 zenwebp header。
// 超限直接拒绝,避免大图走 decode 后被静默降级(原 fallback 存原图)。
if let Err(msg) = crate::api::image::check_upload_dimensions(&data, mime_type.as_str()) {
return Err((
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
Json(json!({
"success": false,
"error": msg
})),
));
}
let is_gif = mime_type.as_str() == "image/gif"; let is_gif = mime_type.as_str() == "image/gif";
let is_webp = mime_type.as_str() == "image/webp"; let is_webp = mime_type.as_str() == "image/webp";
@ -260,9 +273,9 @@ pub async fn upload_image(
}; };
let mut reader = image::ImageReader::with_format(cursor, format); let mut reader = image::ImageReader::with_format(cursor, format);
let mut limits = image::Limits::default(); let mut limits = image::Limits::default();
limits.max_image_width = Some(crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION); limits.max_image_width = Some(*crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION);
limits.max_image_height = Some(crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION); limits.max_image_height = Some(*crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION);
limits.max_alloc = Some(crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS as u64 * 4 + 1024 * 1024); limits.max_alloc = Some(*crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS as u64 * 4 + 1024 * 1024);
reader.limits(limits); reader.limits(limits);
match reader.decode() { match reader.decode() {
@ -299,8 +312,9 @@ pub async fn upload_image(
}; };
result result
} }
Err(_) => { Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Failed to decode image, keeping original format"); // 到这里尺寸校验已通过(超限在 header 阶段被拒),decode 失败只能是真损坏。
tracing::warn!("Failed to decode image ({}), keeping original format", e);
(original_data, mime_to_ext(&mime).to_string(), false) (original_data, mime_to_ext(&mime).to_string(), false)
} }
} }

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@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ pub fn decode(data: &[u8]) -> Result<image::DynamicImage, WebpError> {
let pixel_count = (width as u64) * (height as u64); let pixel_count = (width as u64) * (height as u64);
// 超过最大允许像素数时提前拒绝 // 超过最大允许像素数时提前拒绝
if pixel_count > crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS as u64 { if pixel_count > *crate::api::image::MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS as u64 {
return Err(WebpError::Decode(format!( return Err(WebpError::Decode(format!(
"Image dimensions {}x{} exceed maximum allowed pixels", "Image dimensions {}x{} exceed maximum allowed pixels",
width, height width, height