ci: 修正 Tailwind CLI 包名并收敛重复的环境准备步骤

Tailwind v4 将 CLI 拆为独立包 @tailwindcss/cli，核心包 tailwindcss
不再注册 bin，导致 npx tailwindcss 报 "could not determine executable
to run"。CI 改为安装 @tailwindcss/cli。

同时将 check 与 build 两个 job 重复的 checkout、镜像、Rust/Node/dx/
tailwind 安装步骤抽到 .gitea/actions/setup 复合 action，顶层 env
统一管理 Rust 镜像配置。AGENTS.md 同步说明 v4 拆包这一坑。

.gitea/actions/setup/action.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Setup toolchain
+description: Checkout + configure Cargo mirror + install Rust, Node, wasm target, Dioxus CLI and Tailwind CSS CLI
+
+runs:
+  using: composite
+  steps:
+    - name: Checkout
+      shell: bash
+      run: |
+        git init
+        git remote add origin https://git.rua.plus/${{ github.repository }}.git
+        git fetch --depth 1 origin ${{ github.sha }}
+        git checkout ${{ github.sha }}
+
+    - name: Configure Cargo mirror
+      shell: bash
+      run: |
+        mkdir -p "$HOME/.cargo"
+        printf '%s\n' '[source.crates-io]' "replace-with = 'rsproxy'" '' "[source.rsproxy]" 'registry = "sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/"' > "$HOME/.cargo/config.toml"
+
+    # Rust mirror env (RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT / RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER) is inherited
+    # from the top-level workflow env.
+    - name: Install Rust toolchain
+      shell: bash
+      run: |
+        for i in 1 2 3; do
+          curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --default-toolchain stable && break
+          echo "rustup install attempt $i failed, retrying..."
+          sleep 15
+        done
+        echo "$HOME/.cargo/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
+
+    - name: Install Node.js
+      shell: bash
+      run: |
+        apt-get update
+        apt-get install -y nodejs npm
+
+    - name: Install Rust target
+      shell: bash
+      run: rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
+
+    - name: Install Dioxus CLI
+      shell: bash
+      run: cargo install dioxus-cli --locked
+
+    - name: Install Tailwind CSS CLI
+      shell: bash
+      run: npm install -g @tailwindcss/cli

.gitea/workflows/ci.yaml

@@ -14,40 +14,7 @@ jobs:
   check:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        run: |
-          git init
-          git remote add origin https://git.rua.plus/${{ github.repository }}.git
-          git fetch --depth 1 origin ${{ github.sha }}
-          git checkout ${{ github.sha }}
-
-      - name: Configure Cargo mirror
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p "$HOME/.cargo"
-          printf '%s\n' '[source.crates-io]' "replace-with = 'rsproxy'" '' "[source.rsproxy]" 'registry = "sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/"' > "$HOME/.cargo/config.toml"
-
-      - name: Install Rust toolchain
-        run: |
-          for i in 1 2 3; do
-            curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --default-toolchain stable && break
-            echo "rustup install attempt $i failed, retrying..."
-            sleep 15
-          done
-          echo "$HOME/.cargo/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
-
-      - name: Install Node.js
-        run: |
-          apt-get update
-          apt-get install -y nodejs npm
-
-      - name: Install Rust target
-        run: rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
-
-      - name: Install Dioxus CLI
-        run: cargo install dioxus-cli --locked
-
-      - name: Install Tailwind CSS CLI
-        run: npm install -g tailwindcss
+      - uses: ./.gitea/actions/setup
 
       - name: Check formatting
         run: cargo fmt -- --check
@@ -64,44 +31,8 @@ jobs:
   build:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: check
-    env:
-      RUSTUP_UPDATE_ROOT: https://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/rustup/rustup
-      RUSTUP_DIST_SERVER: https://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/rustup
     steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        run: |
-          git init
-          git remote add origin https://git.rua.plus/${{ github.repository }}.git
-          git fetch --depth 1 origin ${{ github.sha }}
-          git checkout ${{ github.sha }}
-
-      - name: Configure Cargo mirror
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p "$HOME/.cargo"
-          printf '%s\n' '[source.crates-io]' "replace-with = 'rsproxy'" '' "[source.rsproxy]" 'registry = "sparse+https://rsproxy.cn/index/"' > "$HOME/.cargo/config.toml"
-
-      - name: Install Rust toolchain
-        run: |
-          for i in 1 2 3; do
-            curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --default-toolchain stable && break
-            echo "rustup install attempt $i failed, retrying..."
-            sleep 15
-          done
-          echo "$HOME/.cargo/bin" >> $GITHUB_PATH
-
-      - name: Install Node.js
-        run: |
-          apt-get update
-          apt-get install -y nodejs npm
-
-      - name: Install Rust target
-        run: rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
-
-      - name: Install Dioxus CLI
-        run: cargo install dioxus-cli --locked
-
-      - name: Install Tailwind CSS CLI
-        run: npm install -g tailwindcss
+      - uses: ./.gitea/actions/setup
 
       - name: Build release
         run: make build

.gitignore

@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@ uploads/*
 uploads/.cache/
 
 profile.json.gz
+
+# Git worktrees
+.worktrees/

AGENTS.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ make clean         # cargo clean + rm public/style.css
 
 - Rust 1.95+ with `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target
 - `dx` CLI (`cargo install dioxus-cli`)
-- `tailwindcss` CLI v4 (standalone binary)
+- `tailwindcss` CLI v4 — install via `npm install -g @tailwindcss/cli` (v4 splits the CLI into its own package; the `tailwindcss` core package has no `bin`), or use the standalone binary
 - PostgreSQL running locally
 
 ## Environment

src/api/error.rs

@@ -106,4 +106,37 @@ mod tests {
         let msg = err.to_string();
         assert!(msg.contains("文章不存在"), "expected passthrough: {msg}");
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn internal_message_passthrough() {
+        // Internal 错误的消息原样透传，便于向用户展示可读的内部错误描述。
+        let err: ServerFnError = AppError::Internal("内部错误").into();
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(msg.contains("内部错误"), "expected passthrough: {msg}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn transaction_hides_sql_details() {
+        // 事务错误同样返回通用提示，不泄露 SQL 细节。
+        let err: ServerFnError = AppError::tx("deadlock detected on UPDATE posts").into();
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(!msg.contains("UPDATE"), "should not leak SQL: {msg}");
+        assert!(
+            !msg.contains("deadlock"),
+            "should not leak error detail: {msg}"
+        );
+        assert!(msg.contains("操作失败"), "expected generic message: {msg}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn db_conn_query_transaction_all_return_generic_message() {
+        // 三类数据库错误对外均返回固定中文提示，避免泄露实现细节。
+        let db_conn: ServerFnError = AppError::DbConn("x".into()).into();
+        let query: ServerFnError = AppError::Query("x".into()).into();
+        let tx: ServerFnError = AppError::Transaction("x".into()).into();
+
+        assert!(db_conn.to_string().contains("服务暂时不可用"));
+        assert!(query.to_string().contains("操作失败"));
+        assert!(tx.to_string().contains("操作失败"));
+    }
 }

src/api/markdown.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,16 @@ pub fn clean_html(input: &str) -> String {
     crate::api::sanitizer::clean_html(input)
 }
 
+#[cfg(feature = "server")]
+/// 将标题纯文本转义，用于安全地拼进 TOC 的 `aria-label="..."` 与 `<a>` 正文。
+///
+/// 复用 `hooks::comment_storage::escape_html`（转义 `& < > " '`），避免在仓库内
+/// 维护第二份转义实现。原先用 `clean_html` 处理属性上下文会漏掉 `"`，标题形如
+/// `" onmouseover="alert(1)` 会越出属性边界。
+fn escape_heading_text(s: &str) -> String {
+    crate::hooks::comment_storage::escape_html(s)
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 #[cfg(feature = "server")]
 /// Markdown 渲染结果。
@@ -222,10 +232,13 @@ fn generate_toc_html(headings: &[(u8, String, String)]) -> String {
             }
         }
 
-        let clean_text = clean_html(text);
+        // 标题 text 是 pulldown-cmark 收集的纯文本（Text/Code 字面字符），不是 HTML 片段，
+        // 因此正文与属性两处都走 escape_heading_text（转义 & < > " '）。原先用 clean_html
+        // 处理属性上下文会漏掉 `"`，标题中的双引号会越出 aria-label 边界。
+        let escaped_text = escape_heading_text(text);
         html.push_str(&format!(
             "<li><a href=\"#{}\" aria-label=\"{}\">{}</a>",
-            id, clean_text, clean_text
+            id, escaped_text, escaped_text
         ));
     }
 
@@ -357,6 +370,54 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(ul_count, 2);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_toc_html_escapes_quote_in_attr() {
+        // 标题中的双引号不得越出 aria-label 属性边界。
+        let headings = vec![(
+            2u8,
+            "\" onmouseover=\"alert(1)".to_string(),
+            "heading".to_string(),
+        )];
+        let html = generate_toc_html(&headings);
+        // aria-label 中的双引号被转义为 &quot;，无法越出属性边界注入新属性。
+        assert!(
+            html.contains("aria-label=\"&quot; onmouseover=&quot;alert(1)\""),
+            "aria-label 应转义内部双引号，got: {html}"
+        );
+        // 关键：不得出现「未被引号包裹、可被解析为真实属性」的 onmouseover= 片段。
+        // 正文中作为纯文本出现 "onmouseover" 字符串是安全的（无 < 或属性结构）。
+        let attr_injection = "\" onmouseover=\"";
+        let injected = html.matches(attr_injection).count();
+        // 原始输入里有 1 个裸双引号起头；转义后该模式不应再作为属性边界出现。
+        // 注意 aria-label 内部的双引号已变成 &quot;，因此裸的 `" onmouseover="` 不应存在。
+        assert_eq!(
+            injected, 0,
+            "不应存在未转义的属性边界 `\" onmouseover=\"`，got: {html}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_toc_html_escapes_ampersand_in_attr() {
+        let headings = vec![(2u8, "A & B".to_string(), "heading".to_string())];
+        let html = generate_toc_html(&headings);
+        assert!(
+            html.contains("aria-label=\"A &amp; B\""),
+            "& 应在属性中转义，got: {html}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_toc_html_escapes_less_than_in_attr() {
+        // `<` 在属性与正文中都应被转义，避免被误解析为标签起始。
+        let headings = vec![(2u8, "a < b".to_string(), "heading".to_string())];
+        let html = generate_toc_html(&headings);
+        assert!(
+            html.contains("aria-label=\"a &lt; b\""),
+            "< 应在属性中转义，got: {html}"
+        );
+        assert!(!html.contains("a < b"));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn render_markdown_simple_paragraph() {
         let result = render_markdown_enhanced("Hello **world**");

src/api/posts/list.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,29 @@ use super::types::PostListResponse;
 use crate::api::error::AppError;
 use crate::db::pool::get_conn;
 
+/// 单页允许的最大文章数。
+///
+/// 公开的 `list_published_posts` 接口无需认证，若不对 `per_page` 设上限，
+/// 攻击者可传入巨大值迫使数据库扫描并实例化超大 Vec，造成内存放大与拒绝服务。
+const MAX_PER_PAGE: i32 = 50;
+
+/// 允许的最大页码。
+///
+/// `page` 无上限时，攻击者可用海量不同 `page` 值撑大缓存键空间（缓存污染），
+/// 并触发无意义的超大 `OFFSET` 扫描。10_000 对任何实际博客都足够宽裕
+/// （配合 `MAX_PER_PAGE` 最多覆盖 50 万篇文章），同时把缓存键空间限制在有限范围。
+const MAX_PAGE: i32 = 10_000;
+
+/// 将分页参数钳制到安全范围：页码 1–`MAX_PAGE`，每页 1–`MAX_PER_PAGE`。
+///
+/// 注意：返回值必须同时用于缓存键与 SQL 查询，避免同一逻辑页落入不同缓存条目。
+fn clamp_pagination(page: i32, per_page: i32) -> (i32, i32) {
+    (
+        page.clamp(1, MAX_PAGE),
+        per_page.clamp(1, MAX_PER_PAGE),
+    )
+}
+
 /// 获取已发布文章分页列表。
 ///
 /// 优先命中缓存；未命中时查询总数与分页记录，并按 published_at 降序排列。
@@ -22,6 +45,9 @@ pub async fn list_published_posts(
     page: i32,
     per_page: i32,
 ) -> Result<PostListResponse, ServerFnError> {
+    // 钳制分页参数，防止无认证调用方请求超大每页数量导致内存放大 / DoS。
+    let (page, per_page) = clamp_pagination(page, per_page);
+
     #[cfg(feature = "server")]
     {
         let cache_key = crate::cache::CacheKey::PublishedPosts { page, per_page };
@@ -93,6 +119,8 @@ pub async fn list_published_posts(
 /// 需要 admin 权限；结果按创建时间降序，不走缓存。
 #[server(ListPosts, "/api")]
 pub async fn list_posts(page: i32, per_page: i32) -> Result<PostListResponse, ServerFnError> {
+    // 与公开接口保持一致的分页钳制，避免单次请求拉取过多记录。
+    let (page, per_page) = clamp_pagination(page, per_page);
     let _user = get_current_admin_user().await?;
 
     #[cfg(feature = "server")]
@@ -199,3 +227,51 @@ pub async fn get_posts_by_tag(tag_name: String) -> Result<PostListResponse, Serv
         })
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clamp_pagination_keeps_valid_values() {
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(1, 10), (1, 10));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(3, 20), (3, 20));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clamp_pagination_clamps_oversized_per_page() {
+        // 攻击者传入超大 per_page 必须被压回上限，避免内存放大 / DoS。
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(1, 1_000_000_000), (1, MAX_PER_PAGE));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(2, 51), (2, MAX_PER_PAGE));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clamp_pagination_clamps_non_positive() {
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(0, 10), (1, 10));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(-5, 10), (1, 10));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(1, 0), (1, 1));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(1, -100), (1, 1));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clamp_pagination_clamps_oversized_page() {
+        // 巨大 page 必须被压回上限，避免无界 OFFSET 扫描与缓存键扇出。
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(i32::MAX, 10), (MAX_PAGE, 10));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(MAX_PAGE + 1, 10), (MAX_PAGE, 10));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clamp_pagination_max_page_boundary() {
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(MAX_PAGE, 10), (MAX_PAGE, 10));
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(MAX_PAGE - 1, 10), (MAX_PAGE - 1, 10));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn clamp_pagination_max_per_page_boundary() {
+        assert_eq!(clamp_pagination(1, MAX_PER_PAGE), (1, MAX_PER_PAGE));
+        assert_eq!(
+            clamp_pagination(1, MAX_PER_PAGE - 1),
+            (1, MAX_PER_PAGE - 1)
+        );
+    }
+}

src/api/sanitizer.rs

@@ -435,4 +435,76 @@ mod tests {
             "<a rel=\"nofollow noopener\">x</a>"
         );
     }
+
+    // ---- is_safe_url 直接分支测试 ----
+    // is_safe_url 是安全敏感的内部函数，以下测试锁定其各分支的行为契约。
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_allows_https() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        assert!(is_safe_url("https://example.com", &schemes, false));
+        assert!(is_safe_url("http://example.com", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_rejects_javascript() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        assert!(!is_safe_url("javascript:alert(1)", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_rejects_vbscript() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        assert!(!is_safe_url("vbscript:msgbox", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_data_uri_respects_flag() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        // 文章正文允许 data URI
+        assert!(is_safe_url("", &schemes, true));
+        // 评论禁用 data URI
+        assert!(!is_safe_url("", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_allows_relative_and_fragment() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        // 绝对路径
+        assert!(is_safe_url("/path/to/page", &schemes, false));
+        // 锚点
+        assert!(is_safe_url("#section", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_empty_is_safe() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        // 空 URL（如 img 无 src）视为安全。
+        assert!(is_safe_url("", &schemes, false));
+        assert!(is_safe_url("   ", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_allows_other_whitelisted_schemes() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        // mailto / tel / ftp 等均在默认白名单中。
+        assert!(is_safe_url("mailto:user@example.com", &schemes, false));
+        assert!(is_safe_url("tel:+8613800138000", &schemes, false));
+        assert!(is_safe_url("ftp://example.com/file", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_rejects_scheme_with_whitespace() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        // 含空格的 scheme 名是已知的混淆手法，应被拒绝。
+        assert!(!is_safe_url("java\tscript:alert(1)", &schemes, false));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_safe_url_scheme_matching_is_case_insensitive() {
+        let schemes = default_allowed_schemes();
+        // scheme 大小写不敏感：HTTPS 与 https 等价。
+        assert!(is_safe_url("HTTPS://example.com", &schemes, false));
+        assert!(!is_safe_url("JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)", &schemes, false));
+    }
 }

src/highlight.rs

@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ pub mod server {
                     ("golang", "go"),
                 ];
                 for &(from, to) in aliases {
-                    if lang == from {
+                    // 别名比较同样不区分大小写，保证 "RUST" 与 "rust" 等价。
+                    if lang.eq_ignore_ascii_case(from) {
                         if let Some(s) = ss.find_syntax_by_extension(to) {
                             return s;
                         }
@@ -151,4 +152,73 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(result.contains(r#"<span class="storage type rust">let</span>"#));
         assert!(result.contains(r#"<span class="constant numeric integer decimal rust">1</span>"#));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_uppercase_language_falls_back_via_lowercase() {
+        // 大写语言标识应通过小写回退路径匹配到对应语法。
+        let lower = highlight_code("fn main() {}", Some("rust"));
+        let upper = highlight_code("fn main() {}", Some("RUST"));
+        // 大写标识的输出必须与小写标识完全一致，证明回退路径生效。
+        assert_eq!(lower, upper);
+        assert!(lower.contains(r#"<span class="storage type function rust">fn</span>"#));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_resolves_golang_alias() {
+        // 别名表中 "golang" 映射到 "go" 扩展名，输出应与直接用 "go" 一致。
+        let by_alias = highlight_code("package main", Some("golang"));
+        let by_ext = highlight_code("package main", Some("go"));
+        assert_eq!(by_alias, by_ext);
+        // 别名解析必须产出带 span 的高亮输出，而非纯文本。
+        assert!(by_alias.contains("span"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_resolves_bash_alias() {
+        // 别名表中 "bash" 映射到 "sh" 扩展名。
+        let result = highlight_code("echo hello", Some("bash"));
+        assert!(result.contains("span"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_resolves_yml_alias() {
+        // 别名表中 "yml" 映射到 "yaml" 扩展名。
+        let result = highlight_code("key: value", Some("yml"));
+        assert!(!result.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_unknown_language_falls_back_to_plain_text() {
+        // 无法识别的语言应回退到纯文本语法，仍能输出内容。
+        let result = highlight_code("hello world", Some("totally-not-a-language-xyz"));
+        assert!(result.contains("hello world"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_empty_language_string_falls_back_to_plain_text() {
+        // 空字符串语言标识应走纯文本回退路径。
+        let result = highlight_code("just text", Some(""));
+        assert!(result.contains("just text"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_trims_surrounding_whitespace() {
+        // 代码首尾的空白会被 trim 掉再高亮。
+        let result = highlight_code("  \nfn main() {}\n  ", Some("rust"));
+        assert!(result.contains(r#"<span class="storage type function rust">fn</span>"#));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn highlight_code_multiline_output_spans_all_lines() {
+        // 多行代码每一行都应被解析为带 span 的输出。
+        let code = "fn a() {}\nfn b() {}";
+        let result = highlight_code(code, Some("rust"));
+        // 两处 fn 关键字都应出现
+        assert_eq!(
+            result
+                .matches(r#"<span class="storage type function rust">fn</span>"#)
+                .count(),
+            2
+        );
+    }
 }

src/theme.rs

@@ -210,4 +210,45 @@ mod tests {
     fn toggle_switches_dark_to_light() {
         assert_eq!(Theme::Dark.toggle(), Theme::Light);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn toggle_is_an_involution() {
+        // 连续切换两次应当回到原始主题。
+        assert_eq!(Theme::Light.toggle().toggle(), Theme::Light);
+        assert_eq!(Theme::Dark.toggle().toggle(), Theme::Dark);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn theme_derives_equality() {
+        // Theme 派生了 PartialEq，相同变体必须相等。
+        assert_eq!(Theme::Light, Theme::Light);
+        assert_eq!(Theme::Dark, Theme::Dark);
+        assert_ne!(Theme::Light, Theme::Dark);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn theme_preload_script_adds_dark_class() {
+        // 预加载脚本必须包含给 documentElement 添加 dark class 的逻辑。
+        assert!(THEME_PRELOAD_SCRIPT.contains("classList.add('dark')"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn theme_preload_script_reads_local_storage() {
+        // 预加载脚本必须读取 yggdrasil-theme 键，与 THEME_KEY 保持一致。
+        assert!(THEME_PRELOAD_SCRIPT.contains("localStorage.getItem('yggdrasil-theme')"));
+        assert_eq!(THEME_KEY, "yggdrasil-theme");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn theme_preload_script_falls_back_to_prefers_color_scheme() {
+        // 当 localStorage 中无主题时，脚本应回退到系统颜色偏好。
+        assert!(THEME_PRELOAD_SCRIPT.contains("prefers-color-scheme: dark"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn theme_preload_script_swallows_errors() {
+        // 预加载脚本必须包裹在 try/catch 中，避免禁用 localStorage 时抛错。
+        assert!(THEME_PRELOAD_SCRIPT.contains("try"));
+        assert!(THEME_PRELOAD_SCRIPT.contains("catch"));
+    }
 }

src/webp.rs

@@ -237,4 +237,88 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(0u8.clamp(0, 6), 0);
         assert_eq!(6u8.clamp(0, 6), 6);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn webp_error_encode_display() {
+        let err = WebpError::Encode("boom".to_string());
+        assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "WebP encode error: boom");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn webp_error_decode_display() {
+        let err = WebpError::Decode("busted".to_string());
+        assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "WebP decode error: busted");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn webp_error_implements_std_error() {
+        // WebpError 必须实现 std::error::Error，才能在 ? 传播链中使用。
+        fn assert_error<T: std::error::Error>() {}
+        assert_error::<WebpError>();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_converts_luma8_to_rgba() {
+        // Luma8（灰度）图像不在 encode 的快速路径中，应被转换为 RGBA8 后编码。
+        let img = image::DynamicImage::new_luma8(4, 4);
+        let result = encode(&img, 80.0, 2);
+        assert!(result.is_ok());
+        assert!(!result.unwrap().is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_converts_luma_a8_to_rgba() {
+        // LumaA8（带 alpha 的灰度）同样走转换路径。
+        let img = image::DynamicImage::new_luma_a8(4, 4);
+        let result = encode(&img, 80.0, 2);
+        assert!(result.is_ok());
+        assert!(!result.unwrap().is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_lower_quality_does_not_explode_on_solid_color() {
+        // 纯色图是 WebP 的极端情况（信息熵接近 0），确保高低质量都能编码成功
+        // 而非 panic，且产物是合法非空字节流。不假设低质量体积一定更小，
+        // 因为这依赖底层 libwebp 的量化策略，非确定性不变量。
+        let img = image::DynamicImage::new_rgb8(64, 64);
+        let high = encode(&img, 95.0, 4).unwrap();
+        let low = encode(&img, 10.0, 4).unwrap();
+        assert!(!high.is_empty());
+        assert!(!low.is_empty());
+        // 两者都应是合法的 WebP（能被本模块解码回来）。
+        assert!(decode(&high).is_ok());
+        assert!(decode(&low).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_invalid_bytes_returns_error() {
+        // 非 WebP 字节流应返回解码错误而非 panic。
+        let junk = b"this is definitely not a webp image";
+        let result = decode(junk);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_empty_bytes_returns_error() {
+        // 空字节流应返回解码错误而非 panic。
+        let result = decode(&[]);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_error_message_is_descriptive() {
+        // 解码错误的 Display 应包含 'WebP decode error' 前缀，便于日志排查。
+        let err = decode(b"not webp").unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().starts_with("WebP decode error"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_decode_preserves_dimensions() {
+        // 编码再解码后，图像宽高应保持一致。
+        let original = image::DynamicImage::new_rgb8(16, 9);
+        let encoded = encode(&original, 85.0, 4).unwrap();
+        let decoded = decode(&encoded).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(decoded.width(), 16);
+        assert_eq!(decoded.height(), 9);
+    }
 }